Volume 27
Issue 3 Summer 1987
Summer 1987

Clean Air Act - Transboundary Acid Rain Pollution Abatement Administrative Discretion Citizen Suit
Beverly A. Ohline

Recommended Citation
Beverly A. Ohline, Clean Air Act - Transboundary Acid Rain Pollution Abatement - Administrative Discretion
Citizen Suit, 27 Nat. Resources J. 707 (1987).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol27/iss3/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

NOTE
CLEAN AIR ACT-TRANSBOUNDARY ACID RAIN
POLLUTION ABATEMENT-ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION CITIZEN SUIT

An agency statement which has the force to bind subsequent Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency administrators to perform mandatory
duties is a rule and can only go into effect after notice, comment,
and publication in the Federal Register. State ofNew York v. Thomas,
613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985) [Thomas i],rev'd, Thomas v.
State of New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [Thomas !!],
cert. denied, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario v. Thomas,
107 S. Ct. 3196, 96 L. Ed.2d 684 (June 8, 1987), and New York v.
Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 3196, 96 L.Ed.2d 684 (June 8,1987).

"Acid rain" recognizes no border between the United States and Canada. As an international environmental problem, acid rain is difficult to
understand scientifically, difficult to control technologically, and difficult
to handle politically because of its economic and diplomatic consequences. The complex issues of transboundary acid rain were taken to
U.S. courts in State of New York v. Thomas (Thomas),' a unique citizen2
suit brought under the international provision of the Clean Air Act [CAA]
to compel pollution emission reductions in this country for the protection
of the citizens of Canada. The district court in Thomas I became the first
in this nation's history to order the executive branch to abate acid rain
to protect another country.3 The appellate court, however, reversed the
lower court decision. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari.'
Although the plaintiffs were not able to compel implementation of an
abatement program, the Thomas litigation offers lessons on the American
1. State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985) [hereinafter Thomas II,
rev'd, Thomas v. State of New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Thomas 1I], cert.
denied, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario v.Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 3196, 96 L. Ed.2d 684
(June 8, 1987). and New York v.Thomas, 107 S.Ct. 3196, 96 L.Ed.2d 684 (June 8, 1987).
2. Clean Air Act, § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(2), § 7415 (1982). "[Alny person may commence a
civil action ... where there is alleged a failure of the administrator to perform any act . . . which
is not discretionary."
3. Wooley, Acid Rain: Canadian Litigation Options in U.S. Court and Agency Proceedings, 17
U. ToL. L. REv. 139 (Fall 1985).
4. Thomas It, 802 F. 2d at 1448.
5. Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 3196, 96 L. Ed.2d 684
(June 8, 1987), and New York v.Thomas, 107 S.Ct. 3196, 96 L. Ed.2d 684 (June 8, 1987).
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legal system and international politics. 6 The case demonstrates the court's
unwillingness or inability to handle complex, international issues without
clear support of Congress and the executive branch. This case note will
examine both the rationale of the appellate court decision and the policy

issues which influenced that decision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A number of U.S. citizens, several Eastern states, and various environmental groups7 alleged that statements made by a former administrator

of the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]' were sufficient under the
CAA international provision, Section 115,' to create a mandatory duty
in subsequent administrators to implement an abatement program. Under
the CAA, the EPA determines national ambient air quality standards, and

each state establishes regulations through a State Implementation Plan
[SIP] to comply with those standards.'o Under the international provision,
Section 115, if the EPA administrator determines that pollutants from the

United States are endangering the public health and welfare of a foreign
country, the administrator is to order polluting states to revise their SIPs
to begin abatement procedures. " The administrator must base the determination on a report by an international organization 2 and determine that
6. Neither court addresses a separation of powers argument directly. However, the district court
believed the intent of Congress was stated in § 115 of the Clean Air Act. Thomas 1. 613 F. Supp.
at 1481 and 1486. The appellate court, though, believed plaintiffs sought to judicially compel
environmental policy. Thomas II, 802 F.2d at 1448.
7. Plaintiffs included: individuals owning land in and spending time in Canada; the states of
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont; the Sierra Club; the
National Wildlife Federation; and Representative Richard L. Ottinger (D-NY). At the appellate level,
the Province of Ontario also intervened. Defendant is Lee M. Thomas, who is sued in his capacity
as Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The National Coal Association, a
group of utilities including the Alabama Power Co., and three midwestem states intervened on behalf
of the defendant. The court found that Representative Ottinger did not have standing as a congressman
and had not alleged any property interest or personal presence in the affected areas. However, since
standing was found for the other plaintiffs, Ottinger was allowed to remain in the suit.
8. Thomas 1, 613 F Supp. at 1476.
9. Clean Air Act, § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1982), which states: "(a) Whenever the Administrator,
upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies from any duly constituted international agency has reason
to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign
country. . . the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in
which such emissions originate. (c) This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the
in that country
Administrator determines has given the United States essentially the same ights .
as is given that country by this section."
10. Under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642, the Environmental Protection Agency sets
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS); the states each enact implementation plans (SIPs)
to meet these standards. For a discussion of the federalist structure under the CAA, see D. LEwis
AND W. DAVIS, JOINT REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ENVOYS ON ACID RAIN, at 20 (Jan. 1986) [hereinafter
ENVOYS' REPORT].

I1. Clean Air Act, § 115(a), 42 U.S.C. §7415(a) (1982), supra note 9.
12. Id.

Summer 1987]

ACID RAIN POLLUTION

the foreign country offers other nations reciprocal remedies for transboundary pollution problems it causes. 3
The plaintiffs in Thomas argued that letters and a press release written
by former EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle on January 13, 1981,
provided the necessary findings under Section 115 to meet the statutory
requirements.' 4 Costle's letters were written during the last few days of
President Jimmy Carter's administration and sent to Maine Senator George
Mitchell and Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie. Costle stated in
those letters that he had reviewed a report by the International Joint
Commission 6 and was convinced that transboundary acid rain endangered
public welfare in both Canada and the U.S.' 7 Costle also stated that he
had examined the 1980 amendments to Canada's Clean Air Act and found
that Canada's statute offered approximately the same legal recourse to
foreign nations as the U.S. Clean Air Act offered under Section 115."8

Costle then directed the EPA staff to begin identifying the states which
needed to initiate abatement procedures. His directive was never followed.' 9 Plaintiffs contend that since Costle's determinations met the
requirements of Section 115, subsequent EPA administrators were bound
under the CAA to complete the procedures begun under him.'
The primary issue in Thomas was whether the letters and press release
sent by Costle were sufficient under Section 115 to compel mandatory

action by succeeding EPA administrators.' Federal District Court Judge
13. Clean Air Act, § 115(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (1982), supra note 9.
14. Thomas 1, 613 F Supp. at 1476-77.
15. Letter from Douglas M. Costle to George J. Mitchell (Jan. 13, 1981). published in Thomas
I, 613 F. Supp. 1488-89 (D.D.C. 1985), and Letter from Douglas M. Costle to Edmund S. Muskie
(Jan. 13, 1981), published in Thomas 1, 613 F. Supp. 1487-88 (D.D.C. 1985), [hereinafter MUSKIE
LETTER]. Costle's letter was written in response to a letter from Sen. Mitchell asking whether Costle
believed § 115 of the Clean Air Act could be used to address Canada's concerns that emissions from
the United States were contributing to environmental damage in Canada. Brief of appellant intervenors
Alabama Power Company and National Coal Association, at 13-14, citing letter from George J.
Mitchell to Douglas M. Costle (Dec. 23, 1980).
16. INTERNATIONAL JoiNT CoMMIssioN, SEvENmH ANNUAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY,

(Oct. 1980), and Costle, MUSKIE LETTER, supra note 15. in the letter Costle wrote, "I have concluded
that the IJC [International Joint Commission] Report confirms that acid deposition is endangering
public welfare in the U.S. and Canada and that U.S. and Canadian sources contribute to the problem
not only in the country where they are located but also in the neighboring country." Thomas 1, 613
F. Supp. at 1488.
17. Costle, MUSKIE LETTER, supra note 15.
18. Id. Costle states, "I have completed my review of the Canadian legislation . . [and] concluded that the Canadian legislation provides the Government of Canada with authority to give the
United States essentially the same rights as Section 115 of the Clean Air Act gives to Canada....
[Mly determination . . could be changed should the U.S. conclude that future Canadian actions
interpreting or implementing their legislation were not giving essentially the same rights to the U.S."
See also [Canadian] Clean Air Act Amendments, Chap. 45 § 21. 1, 29 Elizabeth 11 1159-62 (passed
Dec. 17, 1980).
19. Wooley, supra note 3, at 143.
20. Thomas 1, 613 F. Supp. at 1476.
21. Id. at 1482-86, and Thomas 11, 802 F.2d 1445.
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Norma Holloway Johnson found that the informality of Costle's statements would not "defeat" the actions for purposes of Section 115.22 The
Court of Appeals disagreed.2 3 Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote
the appellate court opinion while sitting as a circuit judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 4 Ruling on a narrow
ground of administrative law, the Court of Appeals held that any statement
' and must be
which could bind future agency action would be a "rule" 25
promulgated through rule-making procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act [APA]. 26 The agency had to submit the action to
notice, comment, and publication to trigger Section 115.27 The appellate
court determined that Costle's "findings" were not sufficient under Section 115 because they had not been issued through the proper procedure.2"
This casenote focuses on the question of whether the judiciary could
have or should have decided international environmental policy through
interpretation of two Congressional statutes, the CAA and the APA. The
Thomas court did not address this problem directly. In fact, the Thomas
11 decision turned on procedural insufficiency, a policy argument which
made unnecessary. However, the court's decision revealed a sensitivity
to the complexities of the acid rain abatement issues, to the rights and
responsibilities of nations under domestic and international law, and to
the balance of power in the United States among the three branches of
government and an administrative agency. The Thomas case also demonstrated the reluctance of American courts to resolve cases replete with
scientific, technical, economic, and international and domestic political
issues.
THE COURTS AND SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS
The Thomas litigation could have dramatically altered the U.S. acid
rain policy but it did not. The attempt failed, at least in part, because of
the difficulty the American legal system has in dealing with the types of
problems presented in Thomas. Acid rain is a multi-dimensional problem.
It is complicated by inadequate scientific and technical knowledge for
effective and economic control of the pollution. These factors, in turn,
create socio-economic problems which affect national politics and produce
vastly different approaches to abatement programs in the various coun22. Thomas 1, 613 F. Supp. at 1484.
23. Thomas II, 802 F.2d at 1446.
24. The case was heard before Senior Circuit Judges J. Skelly Wright, Abner J. Mikva and now
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.
25. Thomas I!,802 F.2d at 1446-47.
26. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
27. Thomas H, 802 F.2d at 1446-48.
28. Id. at 1448.
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tries. These differences become more apparent when studied in the context
of a domestic court litigation such as Thomas.
In American jurisprudence, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged
harm is "fairly traceable" to an identifiable source. 9 Because scientists
do not totally understand the chemical, transport, and damage components
of acid rain, meeting this requirement is difficult." Primary pollutants
like sulfur dioxide and nitric oxides 3' undergo complex chemical transformations which are not totally understood.3 2 Since acid rain comes from
multiple sources and travels long distances along paths determined by
prevailing meteorological conditions,33 precise traceability from a particular source to a discrete harm is frequently difficult if not impossible.34
Not only is source identification difficult, but "harm" identification
may be equally difficult. Generally scientists agree that acid deposition
can cause extensive damage to aquatic ecosystems, crops, forests, manmade materials, and human health.35 The amount of damage, however,
depends not only on cumulative concentrations of acid deposition but on
the susceptibility of the environment to acidic injury.36 The scientific
community now believes there is adequate information to "assess the
immediate as well as the long-term implications of continuing, highvolume emissions of acid-causing pollutants. . .[and to develop] effective
emissions reduction strategies." 37 In legal terms, though, proving acid
deposition caused certain types of damages may be significantly different
from proving a particular emitter or emitter-state caused specific damages
hundreds of miles away.
Even if the traceability requirement is met, litigation may not be effective if the abatement policy is a contested political issue.3" In this case,
the lack of cost effective and efficient technology for pollution control
makes abatement a very controversial issue, one more suitably handled
by an elected branch of government.
About ninety percent of acid rain causing pollution is produced by
man-made sources.39 In this country, those sources are primarily coal29. Thomas/, 613 F.Supp. at 1481.
30. Id. See also OmCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACID RAIN AND T.ANSPORTED AIt POLLUTrANTS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY at 73-75 (1984) [hereinafter ACID RAIN].
31. ACID RAIN, supra note 30, at 4-5.
32. Id. See also ENvoYs' REPORT, supra note 10, at I.
33. ACID RAIN, supra note 30, at 5.
34. Brief for Appellant at 35-36, State of New York v. Thomas, No. 85-5970, 85-5972, 85-5994
(D.C. Cir., argued May 15, 1986) [hereinafter Appellant Brief].
35. ACID RAIN, supra note 30, at 9-13.
36. Id.
37. ENvoYs' REPORT, supra note 10, at 30.
38. EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus' response to plaintiffs' notice of intent to sue, Appellant Brief,
supra note 34, at 42-43.
39. ENvoYs' REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.
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burning power plants, ore smelting operations, and automobile exhaust
systems.' Since coal-fired boilers are a major source of this pollution,"
researchers have concentrated efforts on reducing sulfur dioxide emissions
from the coal burning processes. Three techniques are currently available:
cleaning the coal prior to its use, which is only partially effective and
only useful on high sulfur coal; 2 installing cleaning devices in the smoke
stacks, which is extremely expensive and would cause utility rates to
increase;43 and switching to low sulfur coal, which would cause a major
upheaval in the coal industry and cost eastern coal miners their jobs.'
Currently none of the alternatives is acceptable in'the United States.
An acid rain abatement program which is not carefully planned may
cause major adverse effects not only on the economy of the eastern coal
mining states but also in states where polluting industries are concentrated.45 Ten central and upper midwestern states produce fifty-three percent of the nation's sulfur dioxide emissions and thirty percent of the
nitrogen oxide emissions. 6 "[Tihe proposed solutions have pitted one
region of the country against another [and] been as politically divisive
as any issue the country has faced."'47
In contrast to the adverse socio-economic situation abatement would
create in the United States, the continued health of the Canadian economy
is dependent upon the immediate implementation of acid rain abatement
measures." Canada imports from the U.S. four times as much sulfur
dioxide as it exports to the U.S. 49 Several of Canada's major industriesforestry, fisheries, and tourism--are particularly susceptible to damage
from acid rain.'
Canada has had more cooperation in initiating abatement, partially
40. Id. at 10- 11.
41. Id. at I1.In the United States, electric utility boilers caused 67% of sulfur dioxide emissions
nationally, and industrial boilers and processes contributed another 25%.
42. Id. at 23-24.
43. Id. at 24.
44. Id.
45. AcID RAIN, supra note 30, at 106-20 & 133-34. Groups studying possible abatement programs
are considering a variety of approaches to mitigate the unequal effects a mandated abatement program
might cause. Among the approaches being considered are liming lakes and streams, mandating
emission reductions for only targeted sources, providing government subsidies for pollution reduction,
and allowing trading and/or substitution of emission reduction requirements.
46. ENvoYs' REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-12. The emissions are concentrated along the Ohio
River Valley in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Id. Nitrogen
oxides are more evenly distributed over the United States than is sulfur dioxide; however, ten states
in the central and upper midwestern section of the country (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and West Virginia) emit 30% of the total
nitrogen oxides and 53% of the sulfur dioxide. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 23.
48. Id. at 33-35.
49. Id. at 30.
50. ld. at 33-34.
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because the government has made it enticing for polluting industries to
implement control mechanisms. In the country's 1985 abatement legislation, 5 Canada offered cooperative government/industry financing for
development and implementation of emission reduction measures, particularly for ore smelters which are Canada's largest industrial source of
acidic pollution.2
While traceability was not a fatal issue in Thomas, the political mandate
may have been more troublesome. Abatement in the United States lacks
united backing of Congress, the executive branch, and the American
public. 3 In Canada, however, abatement has popular support.' "The
shared nature of this problem should not obscure the fact that each of the
two countries contributes to this problem in different ways, is affected
by it in different ways, and therefore must respond to it in different
ways.",
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The Thomas case brought the broad issue of international environmental
responsibility to the American domestic courts. While the American courts
examined procedure, justiciability, plaintiff standing, source/harm traceability, and harm redressability, before the case could be heard on its
merits, 56 these concepts would not be so important in international law.' 7
International law basically establishes a standard of acceptable behavior
between nations. International law is consensual: there is no compulsive
jurisdiction and no enforcement mechanism beyond the subtle pressure
nations place on one another to conform.'" Despite its consensual nature,
international law creates political expectations which a domestic court
must understand in assessing the responsibility of its country in an international context. Although transboundary acid rain is a relatively recent
phenomenon, European nations have struggled with long-distance pollution over a century.Their experiences have helped to set international
51. ENVOYS' REPORT, supra note 10, at 37-40.
52. Id. at 40-43.
53. See, Green, Public DiplomacyandAcid Rain, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 133 (Fall 1985) [hereinafter

Green].
54. See, ENVOYS' REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.
55. id. at8.
56. Thomas 1,613 F. Supp. at 1477-81.
57. See, Handl, Binational Uses of TransboundaryAir Resources: The InternationalEntitlement
Issue Reconsidered, 26 NAT. RES. J.405, 449 (1986).
58. See, M. McDougal, The Impact of InternationalLaw upon National Law: A Policy-oriented
Perspective, STRATEGIES FOR MINIMUM ORDER 157, 175-76 and 190 (1960). See also, R. Falk,
InternationalJurisdiction:Horizontal and Vertical Concepts of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295,
310 (1959).
59. Cleutinx, European Community Air Pollution Abatement Policy, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 113,
115 (1985).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

standards of behavior and define the rights and responsibilities of nations
involved in transboundary pollution disputes."
Europeans first recognized pollution as a transboundary problem in the
1950s when it became apparent that many local pollution control mechanisms, such as tall smokestacks, caused pollutants to travel across na6
tional boundaries and spread harmful deposits hundreds of miles downwind.
Finding a source/harm relationship would be virtually impossible with
multiple source and multiple victim nations.62 Therefore, the European
community began forming international organizations and seeking multilateral agreements to control transboundary pollution. 63 The approach
has been generally successful and recently produced pledges from most
European countries and Canada to reduce acid rain producing emissions
thirty percent by the mid-1990s.'* The European approach reflects a sense
of shared responsibility for a generalized harm.
Originally international environmental law was based on the principle
that a nation could exploit its own resources so long as its activities did
not cause damage to other nations. 65 This concept of sovereign rights in
resource development is gradually changing into one of international
cooperation for the management of shared natural resources.' The "shared
resources" approach requires nations to accept cooperative responsibility.67 Under this theory, a polluting source state would have "the duty to
prevent significant transboundary injury and the duty to abate conduct
causing such harm." 68 The source nation could not refuse to take abatement action even if it claimed scientific and technical knowledge were
insufficient to determine the most cost effective strategy.69
60. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 57, at 448-50.
61. Green, supra note 53, at 133. In the 1950s, "the Norwegians found pink snow on the hills
tilting toward Britain, and other Scandinavians discovered yellow snow on the hillsides facing
Germany." id. Germany began noticing significant damage to forests during the 1970s; later Denmark,
France, Northern Italy, Greece and the low countries also reported forest damage. In 1982 it was
reported that 8% of the Black Forest was affected by acid precipitation. One year later, damage was
reported at 34%, and estimates for 1984 exceeded 50%. Cleutinx, supra note 59, at 115.
62. See, Handl, supra note 57, at 448-49.
63. See, e.g., ACID RAIN, supra note 30, at 305-1I, and Hajost, Introduction (Acid Rain Symposium], 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 107, 109-10 (1985).

64. At the 1983 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Nordic group
proposed that by 1993 or 1995, sulfur dioxide emissions be reduced by 30% from the 1980 level.
The organization of states which supported the proposal became known as the "30 Percent Club."
Hajost, supra note 63, at 110.

65. "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-

mental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." Report of the U.N. Conf. on the Human Env't, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/
14, 7, in II INT'L. LEG. MAT. 1416, 1420 (1972).

66. See. Handl, supra note 57, at 409-16.
67. Id. at 411.

68. Id, at 466.
69. id.
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Although there is concern, this approach may be aspirational, 70 it indicates the trend of developing standards, particularly with regard to
environmental and resource development issues in the international context. If this trend continues, it will be a fundamental influence on states
seeking to manage the international airsheds. 7'
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND NEGOTIATIONS
"In the long run it is most likely that the acid rain issue will be
settled ... through diplomacy or legislation ....
Litigation could
become a springboard to acid rain controls.72
The U.S. and Canada have participated in bilateral negotiations on
environmental problems for nearly eighty years 7 and on transboundary
acid rain problems for more than a decade.' In addition, each nation has
enacted a Clean Air Act 75 and taken various other unilateral steps toward
transboundary pollution control. The Thomas litigation represents one
attempt to seek a unilateral solution; Canada's 1985 abatement legislation
represents another.76 In all likelihood, however, some type of reciprocal
agreement, backed by domestic legislation, will be necessary to create a
lasting solution.77
Environmental negotiations between the U.S. and Canada date back

to the Boundary Waters Treaty of

1909,78

in which each country agreed

not to pollute shared international waters if the pollution would injure
the health or property of the other country.79 The principle was extended
to air pollution in the 1949 Trail Smelter arbitration" which concluded
that "no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in...
a manner. . . [which] cause[s] injury. . . in or to the territory of another." 8 ' More recently, water pollution problems were addressed in the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978.82 The nations
have not yet produced an effective agreement on acid rain abatement.
70. Id. at 411.
71. See, e.g., id. at 467.
72. Wolley, supra note 3, at 139.
73. ENvoYs' REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
74. Id.at 3.
75. [U.S.] Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1982). [Canadian] Clean Air Act, ch. 47,
19-20 Elizabeth !! 951-79 (June 23, 1971) and Clean Air Act Amendments, ch. 45, 29 Elizabeth II
1159-62 (Dec. 17, 1980).
76. See. ENVOYS' REPORT, supra note 10, at 45-46.
77. Wooley, supra note 3, at 139.
78. Boundary Waters Treaty, date of signing Jan. II, 1909, United States-Canada, 36 Stat. 2448,
T.S. No. 548.
79. Id. at 2450.
80. Trail Smelter case, 3 U.N. RIAA 1095, 1096 (1949).
81. Id.
82. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 301,
24 U.S.T. 2268, T.I.A.S. Nos. 7312, 7747 (with Appendix I dated Nov. 21, 1973); Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1384, T.I.A.S. 7312.
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Both the United States and Canada have participated in transboundary
acid rain negotiations since the 1970s. Both countries attended the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution;83 both cooperated in establishing a Bilateral Research Consultation Group," in issuing
a Joint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality, 5 and in signing a Memorandum of Intent. 6
For the last three years, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney and U.S.
President Ronald Reagan have met annually to discuss acid rain. 7 As an
outgrowth of the summit conferences, special envoys were appointed in
1985 to study the problem. 8 The envoys' report concluded that inadequate
abatement technology was a major obstacle to a control program. The

envoys recommended that the U.S. begin a $5 billion, five-year commercial demonstration program on innovative emission control technology.89 On April 6, 1987, President Reagan agreed to work on a bilateral

accord to control acid rain causing emissions, he sought $2.5 billion from
Congress to finance demonstration projects over the next five years.' At
publication time, no implementing legislation had passed to give effect
to these measures. 9
83.

ENVOYS' REPORT, supra note 10, at 3.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id. Five bilateral working groups were established to provide expert scientific and technical
advice to the Coordinating Committee. Id.
87. The heads of state for the U.S. and Canada met on Mar. 17-18, 1985, in Quebec City at
what has become known as the "Shamrock Summit," Id, at 1-2. They met again on Mar. 18-19,
1986, and on Apr. 5-6, 1987. Reagan Endorses Acid Rain Envoys' Report; Mulroney Praises "Real
Movement" on Issue, 16 ENVTL REP. (BNA) 2083 (Mar. 21, 1986), and Proposal for Clean Coal
Technology Funds Said Wasteful, Inadequate by Some in Congress, 17 ENvTL REP. (BNA) 2079
(Apr. 10, 1987).
88. William Davis, former Premier of Ontario, was appointed as.the Canadian envoy, and Drew
Lewis, former Secretary of Transportation, was appointed as the U.S. envoy. ENVOYS' REPORT,
supra note 10, at 5.
89. Id. at 42. In addition to recommending the project to develop innovative technological
pollution controls, the report urged: I) that both nations review their legislation for possible transboundary air pollution control measures, 2) that agencies anticipating changes affecting transboundary
pollution should notify the other country, 3) that the two governments should establish a bilateral
advisory and consultative group on the subject, 4) that standard, accurate monitoring networks should
be established, and 5) that research addressing the damages caused by acid precipitation should be
increased. Id. at 44-5 1, and Envoys Recommend Demonstration Program to Control Acid Rain in
Report to Reagan, 16 ENvTL REP. (BNA) 1707-1708 (Jan. 10, 1986), and Reagan Endorses Acid
Rain Envoys' Report; Mulroney Praises "Real Movement" on Issue, 16 ENVTL REP. (BNA) 1083
(Mar. 21, 1986).
90. Reagan, Mulroney Agree to Seek Accord to Control Emissions That Cause Acid Rain, 17
ENVTL REP. (BNA) 2078 (Apr. 10, 1987).
91. There is some concern that the "accord" may have little effect. While a treaty would have
to be ratified by the Senate, there is no such requirement for an "accord." Some believe that even
if Reagan desired to see abatement action, he would not be in office long enough to work out an
agreement with Canada. Id. at 2079. Reports from the EPA and acid rain research committees are
attempting to minimize the effects of acid rain. See. Scientific Review Reveals Uncertainties in EPA
Data on Acid Rain Aquatic Effects, 17 ENVTL REP. (BNA) 2037 (Apr. 3, 1987); Scientists Agree
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The proposed demonstration project conforms to the U.S. policy of
defer implementation of additional abatement procedures until adequate
research is completed. 92 In the past ten years Congress has passed only
two major items of legislation on acid rain: the Acid Precipitation Act of
1980, 9' which provides for a ten-year scientific research program, and
portions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, which may not be
adequate to handle the multi-source acid rain problem. 94
The CAA provides for control of air quality by regulating the amount
of pollution a particular emitter is allowed to produce.95 However, the
CAA does not address total load, 9' the total concentration of pollution in
the air in any given locale. As a cumulative, multi-source pollutant, acid
rain is a total load problem.97 Legislators have attempted to provide

measures directly addressing the unique acid rain problems in more than
twenty-five control bills introduced since 1980; to date, none has passed. 98
Canada, on the other hand, moved beyond its Clean Air Act as a
mechanism for controlling acid rain when it passed abatement legislation

in 1985. 99 The legislation regulates the total load"m and seeks to reduce

sulfur dioxide emissions fifty percent by 1994. o The legislation provides
for cooperative financing between government and industry to develop

and implement advanced technologies designed for improved smelter
efficiency and reduced pollution."2
Although the international provision of the CAA appeared to be broad
enough to provide a unilateral solution to the transboundary acid rain
problem,' 3 the Thomas litigation based on this provision proved ineffecAcid Emissions Dropping, but StillDisagree on Environmental Effects, 17 ENVTL REP. (BNA) 2116
(Apr. 17, 1987); and Mitchell Says Reagan's Summit Comments, EPA Stand on Acid Rain Controls
Conflict, 17 ENvmL REP. (BNA) 2156 (Apr. 24, 1987). The Clean Air Act requires all cities to meet
federal standards for ozone and carbon monoxide by Dec. 31, 1987. The EPA is considering relaxing
the standard or postponing the deadline to accommodate the 70 or more cities which will not be in
compliance. Thomas Says Substantial Changes in Air Act May Be Needed to Address Ozone NonAttainment, 17 ENvTL REP. (BNA) 2046-47 (Apr. 3, 1987).
92. See, Appellant Brief, supra note 34, at 8-9. See also, ENVOYS' REPORT, supra note 10, at
25, and Handl, supra note 57, at 443.
93. Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8901-05, 8911-12 (1982)).
94. ENVOYS' REPORT, supra note 10, at 20-22.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Brief of Appellant Intervenors at 11, State of New York v. Thomas (Nos. 85-5970, 85-5972,
85-5994) [hereinafter Appellant Intervenors' Brief]. In 1986, three major acid rain control bills were
introduced: HR 4567, S 2203, and S 2813. All three died in committee. 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1986). At time of publication, several bills had been introduced for acid rain control including: S
95, S 316, S 321, S 1123, H 1664, H 1679, and H 266, 100th Cong., ist Sess. (1987).
99. Canadian Abatement Legislation, supra note 51.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id. at 40, 43
103. Wooley, supra note 3, at 141-42.
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tive. No doubt both unilateral and bilateral efforts will be necessary to
change U.S. abatement policy significantly."o
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT SAFEGUARDS
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Although broad policy considerations undoubtedly influenced the Thomas
court decision, the case ultimately failed because of procedural insufficiency: the court found that the agency had not used the necessary APA
rulemaking procedures. Determining how an action should be classified
and what procedure must be used in its propagation is frequently difficult.
In reaching a determination in the Thomas case, the court examined
Costle's findings to determine what type of action they represented, what
effect they might have had, and whether rulemaking procedure was required.
The American judicial system places considerable emphasis on procedure as a primary safeguard of individual rights. In 1946 Congress

enacted the Administrative Procedure Act"5 which prescribes the processes an agency must use in decisionmaking, including the process for
promulgating rules which require notice and comment. " Not all agency
"rules, "however, " are subject to APA notice and comment requirements. ' Only "substantive" rules, those regulations which have the
"effect of law,"" grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other
significant effects on private citizens,"' are bound by rulemaking re-

quirements. Congress explicitly exempted from those requirments general

statements of agency policy,"' interpretative rules,"1 2 and rules of agency
organization, procedure, and practice." 3
104. id. at 139.
105. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-59, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301,
5335, 5372, 7521 (1982).
106. This section on rulemaking procedures states that the agency must first provide notice by
publication in the Federal Register of a proposed rule and then give interested persons an opportunity
to comment. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
107. A "rule" is defined, in part, as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency... " 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). This section explicitly exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." Id.
109. Pickus v. United State Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
110. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-702 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
111.Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The court defined "statements of agency policy" as public announcements of policy which the agency
hoped to implement in future rulemaking or adjudication.
112. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952), defined "interpretative
rules" as statements of what the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means.
113. Pickus, 507 F.2d at 1113, defined "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice"
as technical regulations of the form of agency action and proceedings.
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In addition to classifying the agency action, the courts frequently examine the effect the action has on those within the agency's regulatory
scope" 4 and determine what policy might be served by formal process.
The courts generally require rulemaking procedures if the agency action
has a substantial impact on the rights and interests of private parties
(Cabais v. Egger),"5 creates law (Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder)," 6 has an
immediate and direct impact on individuals (EnvironmentalDefense Fund,
Inc. v. Costle), 7 or forecloses alternative courses of action (Battertonv.
Marshall).18
Although courts are cautious in determining which actions require
additional process,' rulemaking procedures are generally favored as a
protection of individual rights, even though additional process may impair
the efficiency of the agency. 20 The courts have held that APA procedure
should be used whenever it would be useful to the agency or beneficial
to the public."'2 "Exemptions should be recognized only where the need
for public participation is overcome by good cause to suspend it, or where
the need is too small to warrant it. ' 2'
ANALYSIS
The terse opinion and narrow holding of the Thomas 11 court left only
indications of the policy choices the court made. In reviewing EPA actions
for their conformity to Congressional guidelines, the court focused on
the statutory provisions of the APA and the CAA. The questions before
the court were two-fold: If Costle's findings were sufficient under Section
115 to trigger a mandatory duty to begin abatement would rulemaking
procedures be required, and did Congress intend for Section 115 to mandate compulsory abatement procedure?
Although the court opinion does not directly address policy questions,
the underlying issue was one of separation of powers: Should the court,
through statutory interpretation, compel an executive agency to take abatement action contrary to U.S. international acid rain policy? The case
turned on procedural insufficiency, but the ruling suggests that the court
114. United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984).

115. 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
116. 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C.Cir. 1952).
117. 636 F.2d 1229-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
118. 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
119. Some courts have become cautious in determining which agency actions require additional
process since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) in which the court prohibited courts from imposing procedures on agency
action beyond those required by the APA. See discussion in Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237.
120. See, e.g., Kast Metals, 744 F.2d at 1153.
121. Guardian Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Say. and Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 668
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
122. Batterton, 648 F2d at 704.
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carefully considered this policy question and selected action which preserved the separation of powers doctrine.
The court began its analysis by examining the effects of an action
capable of triggering mandatory abatement under Section 115 and applying the "substantial impact"' 23 and "Batterton" tests.'24 The Thomas
11 court said that if Costle's findings were sufficient under Section 115
to bind subsequent EPA administrators to initiate an abatement policy,
they would be a "statement of 'future effect designed to implement...
law or policy' and thus a rule." 25 The court also said that the SIP revisions
which would follow the EPA actions would "jeopardize" or "substantially
affect" the rights and interests of private parties. 6 The court in National
Association of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker, found rulemaking
procedures were necessary to assure fairness and participation for the
parties affected by the findings. 27 Since Costle's findings were not subject
to notice, comment, and publication, they were not sufficient to create
mandatory abatement duties under Section 115.128
Case law supports the Thomas 11 determination that triggering actions
under Section 115 should be subject to rulemaking procedures because
they would have a binding effect on future agency and court action. The
findings also would have an impact, although indirectly, on individual
rights. Determining exactly when rulemaking procedures were mandated,
however, was a matter of judicial discretion. Since individual rights would
not be affected until the states revised their regulations, the court could
have found it adequate for the EPA to use rulemaking procedures at the
time it notified individual states that SIP revisions would be necessary.
In EnvironmentalDefense FundInc. v. Costle [EDF1, 29 the EPA was not
required to use rulemaking procedures at its investigatory stage even
though the investigatory information would subsequently be used for
regulatory purposes. The court said these "investigatory activities preliminary to promulgating regulations"'" would have no immediate or
direct effect on the companies or the general public. 3' The Thomas court
rejected an EDF analysis saying Costle's actions were not investigative. 32
'
The court saw the delayed impact on individuals as relevant only to the
question of ripeness.3
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Cabais, 690 F2d at 237.
Batterton, 648 F.2d at 702.
Thomas 11, 802 F.2d at 1446-47.
Id. at 1447.
Home Health. 690 F.2d at 949, citing Batterton, 648 F.2d at 703.
Thomas Ii,802 F2d at 1448.
636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter EDF].
Id. at 1255.
Id.
Thomas H, 802 F.2d at 1447.
Id.
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Instead of concern over the immediacy of the action, the court focused
its attention on whether Congress intended the international section of
the CAA to create a mandatory duty. It viewed the Thomas litigation as
an attempt to use judicial relief to affect agency policy.' 34 If the statute
were executed as anticipated by Congress, the court reasoned, the EPA
would have followed the pattern established in NationalAsphaltPavement
Ass'n v. Train,'35 where the EPA issued findings that asphalt concrete
plants were "significant contributors" to air pollution at the same time
the agency issued proposed standards of performance for the industry.' 36
Both .statements were issued according to rulemaking procedures.' 37
The court felt that Section 115 was not being executed as Congress
had intended."'3 Although the court does not discuss the effects a holding
for plaintiffs might have, the court was aware of a number of pending
cases in which plaintiffs were alleging that preliminary statements made
by a government agency triggered mandatory action which the agency
failed to execute. ' If the court allowed unintentional actions to trigger
mandatory agency actions, the power to set policy would be removed
from the agency. The court would not participate in this process, saying,
"How and when the agency chooses to proceed to the stage of notification
triggered by the findings is within the agency's discretion and not subject
to judicial compulsion."'
Facially, the court was asked to examine two statutes to determine if
the agency violated a Congressionally mandated duty. "'As the creator
of administrative agencies like EPA, Congress has the right and duty to
set statutory provisions defining agency authority and procedures. 42 It is
within the court's authority to determine whether an agency has obeyed
the will of Congress."'
134. Id. at 1446, 1448.
135. 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
136. Id. at 778.
137. Id. at 780.
138. Thomas 11,802 F.2d at 1446, 1448.
139. The court was aware of a number of suits pending at the time of trial in which citizens
brought suit to compel EPA administrative actions based on claims similar to those asserted in the
Thomas case. Appellant Intervenors' Brief, supra note 98 at 34. In Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas, No. 85-9507 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 5, 1985), for example, plaintiffs contend that statements
made in EPA staff documents concerning the health and welfare effects of sulfur dioxide trigger the
nondiscretionary duty to revise the NAAQS to make them more stringent for sulfur dioxide. In
Natural Resources Defense Council v.Thomas, No. 86-603 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 1986), plaintiffs
assert that statements made by EPA in notices soliciting public comment on whether EPA should
regulate certain pollutants triggered a mandatory duty to list these pollutants and develop emission
standards for the sources emitting them.
140. Thomas 11, 802 F.2d at 1448.
141. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
142. See, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971).
143. Id.
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However, this case required another level of inquiry. The CAA, the
Congressional act the court was asked to enforce, was passed during the
previous presidential administration. Costle's findings, likewise, reflected
the policy of the former administration. The policy plaintiffs sought to
have the court uphold was contrary to that of the present administration.'"
The Thomas case presented other problems which conflicted with principles of separation of powers. The court did not address the divisive
political nature of the acid rain abatement question, nor the general policy
to reserve such issues for the elected Congressional branch. Nor did the
court discuss the policy of reserving questions of foreign affairs for the
executive branch to allow the nation to speak with one voice. t45 Although
the court did not explicitly acknowledge these policy considerations, its
decision upheld these long-standing principles.
CONCLUSION
The appellate court decision in Thomas v. State of New York was based
on a narrow issue in administrative law. Yet the decision reflected the
reluctance of the court to interfere with actions of co-equal branches of
government, particularly in regard to broad policy matters in international
affairs. When the appellate court ruled that Costle's determinations were
inadequate because they did not follow the procedures stated in the Administrative Procedures Act, the court removed any power citizens might
have had to seek court enforcement under the international section of the
Clean Air Act. After Thomas, Section 115 became a policymaking tool
available only to agency actors for use after formal notice, comment, and
publication.
BEVERLY A. OHLINE

144. U.S. policy is discussed in Appellant Brief, supra 34, at 9
145. Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 at 211 (1962).

